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PREFACE TO THE SECOND PRINTING

The intelligence experience which I drew upon to write this book straddled the US participation in World War II by a few months at either end. (September 1941 - June 1946.)

For most of the period the obvious matter of first intelligence concern was the Axis enemy. But even then as we studied the Axis we knew that our fortunes were not wholly tied to its capabilities for war and the vulnerabilities which plagued them. We were aligned with many allies and of them the Soviet Union was of crucial importance. It was absorbing a large proportion of the enemy's destructive power and in its willingness and ability to take this punishment and in its capability to fight back lay what might have been, quite literally, the outcome of the war. Far from voluntarily keeping us informed as to how things looked and how well prepared it

was to cope with Axis potential, the USSR told us virtually nothing. [Thus, if intelligence\* components of our government had not mobilized the country's leading Soviet scholars and set them to work analysing what meager material was available -- practically all of it in the public domain -- the US would have known little more than what was reported from Embassy Moscow and otherwise divined from the scope of Soviet demands upon our Lend-Lease Administration.]

[\* In this preface, as in the book itself, I am using the word "intelligence" as it is generally understood in the non-Communist world. The whole book is an elaborate definition of some of the main facets of this concept (see the Appendix and especially its chart). However, it is worth noting here that the Communists -- most notably the Soviets -- use the word in a more restricted and quite different sense. To begin with, the expression "overt intelligence" is to them pretty much a contradiction in terms. All intelligence work and intelligence (the resulting knowledge) is to them highly secret. It is almost wholly espionage, counter-espionage, and the fruits thereof. Furthermore, intelligence being the highly important part of the general revolutionary apparatus that it is, the concept "intelligence" embraces the broad range of Communist clandestine operations, which are made feasible by clandestinely-procured information.

If in fact the Soviets engage in what we of the West call "intelligence research and analysis" they have another name for it and a name bereft of the cachet of "intelligence." It is seemingly inconceivable to them that large numbers of people will be quite overtly engaged in something known as intelligence work, able to inform all and sundry that this is in fact their calling, and obliged to guard with secrecy only those matters having to do with their sources, methods, the foci of their attention, and the content of their findings.]

Hindsight vindicates this effort -- every bit as much for the headstart it gave us for our prime post-war (analytical) intelligence task as for the enlightenment it afforded its contemporary consumers.

The final year of the war and the first months of the peace conveyed some strong intimations of future Soviet behavior. By the time I had finished my final draft of this book (March 1943), it was clear that the Soviets had in fact sworn out an ideological war; George Kennan in his Mr. "X" article had not only spelled (it) out but had elaborated a US policy to contain it; Walter Lippmann had some months since christened the unhappy state of world affairs the Cold War.

My manuscript, I trust, reflected the growing strains of the (chilly new) relationship; many of its exhortations took off from (a) general unease (of) things to come: most of our friends in the non-Communist world were in the turmoil of post-war recovery; the Cominform now had in its sights an all but limitless array of (fat and) easy targets. One readily perceived that its activities would be numerous and world-wide. Its power source, the Soviet Union, was rapidly recuperating and, while the rest (of us) fell into what General Marshall called military "demoralization,"

it maintained a formidable military potential. This was (rapidly) shaping up to be the threat which would hold Western Europe as virtual hostage and under which the (USSR) could, for the time being, conduct many of its Cold War forays with relative safety.

Happily the US did not have to stand off the (adversary's) assaults in a condition of pre-Pearl Harbor ignorance. Thanks to our wartime labors we not only possessed a stock of relevant and useful information about the Soviet Union, we also had the makings of a far better intelligence profession than had existed heretofore. (The analytical arm of) US intelligence was able to identify its principal objectives -- and with precision; it had developed some mature doctrine; it had mastered some difficult and important methodologies; it was moving towards a common technical vocabulary; and, most important of all, it had produced a good number of sophisticated practitioners. With these considerable assets and with the task ahead large but seemingly manageable, there was probably a short period during which the shrunken post-war intelligence community felt itself not wholly inadequate to face the future. Let me underscore the relative brevity of this period.

In 1948 few knowledgeable Americans could estimate with confidence the imminence of 1949's most dramatic event. [In the early autumn of] 1949, the Soviets brought off ~~the~~<sup>a</sup> nuclear explosion which we detected — almost certainly their first.

There was of course an immediate and dramatic impact which came with the realization of the end of the American nuclear monopoly. But here as in so many cases a full comprehension of just what the event portended had to await the passage of time. At the moment, one's thinking was a sort of spectral chamber of horrors, a space within which there lay a jumble of exhibits no one of which came through more sharply or disturbingly than any other. The true dimensions of Soviet rearmament policy and global strategy emerged with measured tread. The USSR's role in the Greek civil war, its attempts to panic the Turks and Iranians, its blockade of Berlin, and finally its participation by proxy in the Korean war clinched previous estimates of its aggressive expansionism.

Whatever the Soviet leaders' ultimate purpose with respect to its huge ground establishment, they would not dismantle it. Furthermore, they were obviously embarked on a program of modernization of other branches of the military service.

In short order they began the weaponization of the principles tested in the first nuclear explosion. Knowledge of their testing and of other related activities revealed a large and growing ability to manufacture the necessary fissionable materials. On the basis of two B-29s which they had hi-jacked from the US, they had begun the production of their own first propeller-driven heavy bomber, the TU-4. On the basis of twenty-five Moon jet engines purchased in 1947 from the British, they began the development of their own engines and of airframes to match. The first MIG fighters soon came off the line, followed by the jet bombers. Coincidentally, and largely on the basis of German technology, they initiated serious work on the whole family of missiles. Bold decisions regarding naval forces were made, and a formidable fleet of submarines began to take to the seas.

In most -- if not all -- of these developments there were for the US ominous signs. Soviet leaders were rearming for a good deal more than conflict within the Eurasian land mass. An intercontinental offensive capability was being built into (their) military establishment. Before the 1950s were out there were three weapons systems specifically designed to deliver nuclear warheads on the

continental United States: the manned bomber, the inter-continental ballistic missile, and the missile-armed submarine.

Along with these offensive systems came much greater developments in air defense: early-warning and other radar, all-weather fighter-interceptor aircraft, anti-aircraft missiles -- the now famous SAMs -- and later on an extensive effort to build and deploy an anti-missile missile system.

The dramatic developments in (matters) military had their counterpart in (Soviet) Cold War strategy. With the passage of time Soviet leaders moved from a policy of exclusively aiding those Communist parties of the Free World which were potentially or actually powerful enough to warrant the investment, to a new policy of grants and loans to non-Communist, even bourgeois governments. Their underwriting of the Aswan Dam and military assistance to Nasser was a first step in the move to push Soviet influence into uncommitted states of the underdeveloped world.

The United States took these developments to heart. We entered the era, inter alia, of the fifty billion dollar

defense budget, the multi-billion dollar foreign aid program, and the world-wide system of pacts and alliances. We began to brace ourselves and our friends to deter Soviet aggression, meanwhile moving out into the far-flung theaters of the Cold War.

But Communist busyness was not solely responsible for the vastly augmented rate of change in the post-1948 world. The rapidity of the break-up of the colonial empires and the emergence of the many new (and) highly unstable states made its own important contribution to world chaos. At the other end of the spectrum, consider the rapidity with which the defeated Germans and Japanese recovered from the war and began to play an important role in the world. In still a third and quite different vein, consider the population explosion -- in many ways more awesome than those other explosions that went off at Alamagordo and Semipalatinsk.

To the devotee of the intelligence calling this spectrum of changes in the world situation and the speed with which they were taking place were matters of profound professional concern. Would the content of this book -- as it is here reprinted (verbatim) -- still usefully serve? In many ways, yes.

It will continue to serve those classical (analytical) aspects of the intelligence task which must perform -- at least in Western thinking -- always be with us. That the task has become vastly larger does not in itself invalidate the principles which the book endeavors to set forth and defend. That there are now one hundred fifteen members of the United Nations as against fifty-one in 1945 is a symbol of the augmentation.

To each of the new members we send an ambassador and staff; each embassy has its back-up in the Department of State. Scarcely a one of the new states that does not offer a problem or an opportunity for our policy-makers: the issue may be political, it may be economic, it may be military; it is probably all three. Most of the decisions to be taken in Washington will in last analysis involve choices of varying degrees of difficulty, many of them substantial sums of money. They require that the decider make his choice in an environment of knowledge. There are now thousands of matters to which the United States could have shaded or closed its eyes in the heyday of colonialism but which now it must know about and know about through its own intelligence (efforts).

While this incremental burden has grown to present proportions, there has been no lessening of the burden of staying informed about the array of long-established states.

This merely means that there is a wider ground to cover, and that whereas much of the new ground is less familiar to us than, say, Western Europe, it is not so different that the old methodologies will not work. In this respect the intelligence business is much the same only much bigger.

The Cold War and the ubiquity of its battlefields, large and small, not only contributes to the size of the intelligence task, but the importance of its mission as well.

The penalties for ignorance in a truly peaceful situation can be severe, a thousand times more so in the presence of an adversary who is everywhere trying to do you in with the whole panoply of his department of dirty tricks, and who keeps going until outwitted or until he perceives his operations too dangerous to warrant the risk. The fact that most of the offensive operations of the Cold War are hatched in deepest secrecy, elaborately

cloaked and mingled with artful deceptions, means that counter-action must in itself rest upon the most subtle sort of protective intelligence work. The wider apart or the more extensive the battle areas of this conflict, the greater the intelligence chore. When the enemy reaches one of the terminal points in his range of Cold War strategies -- the stirring up and supporting of what he calls a "war of national liberation" -- the intelligence requirement behind a counter-insurgency action becomes a very large undertaking. Much of what is here written can be applied to the highly important analytical facet of this intelligence chore.

But of all the intelligence obligations characteristics of today's world, the largest and most urgent is that consequent to living under the threat of nuclear conflict. The heart of the task derives from the very high rate of change in the new weapons systems and in their destructiveness. If Napoleon's G-2 had dozed off for a year, he would not recognize each of the horses in a given Prussian cavalry regiment. The new animals would, however, still be ordinary horses; none would be a Pegasus. Such, however, is the pace of modern technology that no intelligence service

dare doze a moment lest the docile cavalry mount of yesterday turn up tomorrow not winged, but jet-propelled and nuclear-loaded. Almost incredible as it may seem, in the brief span of the (fifties) the Soviets brought into service literally dozens of new weapons systems. The pace (seemingly) stated not.

That the United States was able during the (fifties) to keep these alarming developments under what, in this book, I call surveillance, and hence be able to keep its own prodigious defense efforts attuned to the shifting capabilities of our principal antagonist, is wholly attributable to the admirable work of American strategic intelligence. But much of the surveillance was of a sort not contemplated in this book, and its raw product not necessarily legible to the kind of analyst I had in mind when I wrote. It is not as if all of the old methods of watching were superseded, but they did have to be supplemented and supplemented by new and all-but-undreamed-of intelligence collection devices and methods.

The events that had to be watched were taking place in parts of our environmental envelope not normally frequented by earthbound observers: untravelled corners

of the earth and its mysterious subsurface, unknown reaches of the seas, the air above us, and outer space beyond that. [The wonders of modern technology have been invoked. What these wonders observe and what they report, they report not in words, but in one of the new languages of number, line, symbol, or picture.]

[The readers and translators of this new literature is a new echelon of technical specialists. Though the fundamental truths which its members have sought] were as old as science and technology, politics, economics, strategy and military policy, the approaches that had to be transversed to reach the panorama were those denied to the non-specialist.

It was not only that the new data were strange, their volume was and is formidable. When considered along with all other information collected by other more classical means, the amount very rapidly gets beyond the competence of old-fashioned library science. How can such quantities be sorted, catalogued, filed, and retrieved upon demand; how used by a human researcher who is endeavoring to discern a useful meaning? Computers and their multiform auxiliary machines for the electronic

handling of data are already becoming the indispensable tools for solving the intelligence analysts' problems of information storage and retrieval. Not so long hence the studious intelligence type will sit at a fancily-wired desk [and dial himself into a central "library" file, which employs the magnetic and micro-photographic data storage facilities of our large metropolitan businesses.] What he wants to read will appear on a sort of TV scope before his eyes.

The computer has also had its dramatic impact on analysis. With it, problems in the new esoteric areas of research into the behavior of missiles, space craft, nuclear explosions, and so on have become manageable; some of the heretofore all-but-unsolvable problems of more familiar disciplines -- economics, for example -- are even susceptible to tentative or solid solution. The point is that just as the miracles of modern technology have vastly complicated the world with which the intelligence analyst must cope, so have these same miracles become serviceable to his requirements. The activity of intelligence research has deepened and broadened, but thanks to the new uses of electronics it can move with a speed commensurate at least with the speed of the world's rate of change.

But whatever the new wrinkles, the eternal verities remain. These are the verities which I tried to stress in this book: [there is no substitute for the intellectually competent human -- the person who was born with the makings of a critical sense and who has developed them to their full potential; who through first-hand experience and study has accumulated an orderly store of knowledge; and who has a feeling for going about the search for further enlightenment in a systematic way.] The great accomplishments of today's intelligence brotherhood have been of two sorts: collection and analysis. In the one no less than the other the thoughtful effort of bright and studious people conducting their business within the very broad limits of the scientific method, is the thing which did the trick.]

*2nd review,  
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I closed out the book with this sentiment because I felt that there were perhaps fellow countrymen who, in a mood of petulant criticism of the intelligence calling, would pretend that a few rules of thumb, an appeal to folk wisdom, and a little intuition could serve the purpose and incidentally cost a lot less in time and effort. Today I close out this essay reiterating my credo for another reason.

A one-time high-ranking officer in Soviet intelligence, General Alexander Orlov, has published a remarkable book and (one which every devotee of the intelligence calling should read, Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare.\* On pages eight and nine he quotes a short passage from my book and notes that the injunction it carries is "but one step from mysticism and metaphysics." Throughout his opening chapter, in which this observation occurs, he professes little respect for the philosophy of Western intelligence work which is at the heart of my book. He advances as the only philosophy, one which is in almost diametrical opposition. If you wish to know the other man's secrets of state, he admonishes, put your faith in that advanced form of second-storey work known as espionage. This is the technique, which by making possible the purloining of the other man's secret documents, leads one surely to what one wants most to know. Incidentally, General Orlov gives some stunning examples to prove his case.

I do not for an instant wish to debate the values of a well-placed spy. Lots of countries, [including our own,] have lost priceless secrets of state to ingenious enemy

\* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1963.)

agents. (The artfully) contrived access to the documents, the borrowing, reproduction, and return has been by all odds the most successful and frequently employed method of operation. What I do, however, wish to debate is one of the implicit assumptions underlying General Orlov's proposition. Does he really believe that on any important subject he wants to name there is a single document (or group of documents) which contains the desired secret? Does he really believe that the spy could know enough about such a treasure to look for it in the right place? Does he really believe that some spy or other could secure access to the right place or could recognize the document if he saw it? Or does he believe that successful espionage will provide such a large volume of secret documents, that the highest priority one or two will all but inevitably be included in the collection? ]

There is no question that General Orlov's successors in the Soviet secret intelligence organization have directed the lifting of a great many secret documents. But when they had them in hand, what then? Did every document proclaim on its face: "I am not the off-beat thoughts and

recommendations of a highly-placed but erratic advisor; I am not a draft from high quarters intended solely as a basis for discussion; I am not one of those records of decision which will be rescinded orally next day, or pushed under the rug and forgotten, or nibbled to death by disapproving implementers. I am the McCoy, I am authoritative and firm; I represent an approved intention and I am in effect.

If I were to make a bold guess, I would guess that (perhaps one) reason why the Soviet leaders got themselves into the fix they did with the missiles in Cuba was because some Soviet secret operative stole some secret documents which turned out to be the wrong documents. If I were to make another -- and not such a bold guess at that -- it would be that the US faced the Soviets down in this crisis, not because we had stolen a Soviet document that told us how Khrushchev and the Presidium would react to our defiance, but because we based our decision on far more costly, voluminous, and <sup>#</sup>subtle sorts of information and a lot of rigorous thoughtful analysis.

Is it possible that the Soviets were (led) by purloined documents to a misjudgment in Korea? Perhaps they became

convinced that we would not fight because such papers confirmed public US intimations to the effect that southern Korea was not deemed to lie within our strategic perimeter. And, to push the point further, suppose Soviet agents had had the run of our most sensitive files, would they have come across the document that told them the opposite and that we would fight? This clearly would have been a document of very highest importance. But they never would have found it. It did not exist. The decision to fight was Mr. Truman's and he made it on the spot after the Soviet-supported attack was on. Thus, if knowledge of the other man's intentions is to be divined through the reading of his intimate papers and one's own policy is to be set on the basis of what one discovers, here is a case where policy was on the rocks almost by definition.

And so to end this preface as I ended the book. Whatever the complexities of the puzzles we strive to solve and whatever the sophisticated techniques we may use to collect the pieces and store them, there can never be a time when the (thoughtful man) can be supplanted as the intelligence device supreme. Even the seemingly most valuable document cannot be unquestioningly accepted as

the basis for action until it has been evaluated in terms of something other than authenticity of source.

If we agree on this principle, I do not see how we can disagree much about that "something other than."

It is, in last analysis, a judgment as to the plausibility of content -- a judgment which a disciplined mind will construct on the basis of knowledge, wisdom, and plain horse-sense.